GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

ON THE

STATE OF AFFAIRS

IN

IRELAND,

AND

ITS DEFENCE

AGAINST AN

INVASION.

By a Country Gentleman.

Dublin:

Printed for GEORGE JOHNSON,

And ſold at No. 15, Parliament-ſtreet, and to be had of all the Bookſellers.

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THE Author has very juſt grounds to fear, that Military men will tell him in the language of Horace, *Ne ſutor ultra crepidam.* Should they, however, contrary to their expectation, find ſomething worthy of their peruſal in the following ſheets, he will be highly honored, though not altogether diſappointed.

They well know that the uniform by no means conſtitutes the Soldier or the General; and that their profeſſion may ſometimes liſten with advantage to the counſel of men no wiſe connected with it.

Whatever are their opinions, they may be convinced that there are even *Country Gentlemen* in Ireland, who have ſerved under Generals that could ſafely be compared with any which either Britain or France can produce.

Cork, May 10, 1797.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

ON THE

STATE OF AFFAIRS

IN

IRELAND, &c.

THERE are in Politics, as well as in Religion, truths which are always diſagreeable and ſometimes dangerous to reveal. But there are certain conjunctures in which it becomes not only proper, but even neceſſary, to reveal them, whatever impreſſions they may make. He that flatters miniſters when they act wrong, is either a corrupted Traitor, or a puſillanimous miſcreant. He that abuſes miniſters, merely becauſe they are in power, only attempts to cover the moſt ſordid views of ſelf-intereſt and ambition, under the maſk of patriotiſm, and is equally contemptible. A good citizen will paſs an impartial judgment upon public affairs, equally indifferent to applauſe or to cenſure.

If ever circumſtances were alarming, it is at this moment: if ever a period called forth the patriotiſm of all ranks of a ſtate to ſave the whole from deſtruction, it is the preſent in Ireland. We have often ſeen half England ſet in uproar by a ſimple motion in the Houſe of Commons, or ſome trifling incident magnified into a plot againſt the Liberties of the People. We may perceive ourſelves now almoſt calm ſpectators of a formidable invaſion ready to take place upon our coaſt, and which our utmoſt exertions alone can prevent from involving us in conqueſt and ruin.

Should the ſucceſſes of the French oblige our only remaining ally, the Emperor, to make a peace; and that not be immediately ſucceeded by another with us, is it not clear that they will endeavour to invade Ireland? All their threats to land in either England or Scotland, are plainly intended to lull us into a fatal ſecurity. The French Directory, we may rely on by experience, is too politic to expend ſome thouſands of lives, and ſome millions of livres upon a deſcent either upon North or South Britain. The people of Scotland are not diſaffected, nor are, generally ſpeaking, thoſe of England, which has a formidable army to defend it. Scotland is too poor a country, and its inhabitants too contented with their ſituation,

tion, to tempt an ambitious enemy with views either of plunder or of conqueſt.

Ireland unfortunately preſents the moſt alluring proſpect of invaſion from the alarming diſcontent which prevails in its moſt populous province. That this country is provided with a pretty numerous and tolerably diſciplined Army and Artillery, under an active commander in chief, is certain. But the moſt formidable armaments avail but little in defending a country, whoſe inhabitants are not active againſt the common enemy.

Ireland has lately narrowly eſcaped one invaſion; but it may be its fate ſoon to oppoſe another much more formidable. Whether or not, it is our duty to loſe no time in preparing for it, and to collect within ourſelves the neceſſary means of repelling every invader.

It is true, that countries apparently leſs prepared than we are for reſiſtance, have formerly defeated very powerful enemies*. But it is a fallacious

* There are numerous examples in hiſtory, both antient and modern, of nations which reſiſted the moſt aſtoniſhing ſuperiority of numbers, not only by their united valour, but what is ſtill more wonderful, the genius of their leader.

I. The Grecians defeated the Perſians who were at leaſt twenty degrees more numerous than themſelves.

II. Epaminondas,

ſallacious reaſoning which ſupports itſelf by appearances. There are only two reſources in the moment of public danger—Valour and Perſeverance.

Fortunately however for us of late, the greateſt part of the Iriſh nation ſeems determined to unite in their own defence, and to ſuſpend, if they have not forgot, their old animoſities. To every genuine Iriſhman it is ſtill however humiliating to perceive, that the Britiſh fleet alone is looked up to as the only palladium of our ſafety. It is a mean acknowledgment of our inability to defend ourſelves: a confeſſion which ſhould wound the national pride infinitely more than the apprehenſions of the moſt dreadful invaſion. There cannot be a more convincing proof of the downfall of a nation, than its reliance on ſtrangers for defending it.

II. Epaminondas, at the head of the moſt ſtupid and brutal people in Greece, defeated double the number of Spartans till then ſo formidable.

III. Alexander, with only 30,000 men, conquered the greateſt empire in the univerſe.

IV. In our own days Frederick II. King of Pruſſia, formed from the moſt wretched people in Germany, an army with which he ſucceſsfully oppoſed one of the moſt dreadful invaſions recorded in hiſtory. His troops would then have in all probability beaten any other army in the world. I am far from thinking they would do as much at preſent.

To

To enter into a tedious and unintereſting diſcuſſion concerning the political ſtate of the country, is neither my buſineſs nor my intention. To offer a few hints to my military countrymen, relative to a war in Ireland, is my only ambition. To animate the preſent generation to defend their poſſeſſions, or the riſing one their future inheritance, is the moſt ſublime of all ſubjects; but would require a a power of eloquence to which in vain my humble abilities could aſpire.

If, however, in the following pages I ſhould be led to mention any thing concerning our political circumſtances, it is only from a deſire of illuſtrating my ſubject.

Previous to our entering into the detail of military affairs, it may be proper to take a rapid view of the ſtate of affairs in Europe; and by endeavouring to point out the relative ſituation of Ireland, ſhew the means which may be adopted to preſerve the political exiſtence of theſe countries againſt the coloſſal power of France.

France has now become one of the moſt powerful of empires, antient or modern. That of Rome equalled it neither in fertility of ſoil, in reſources, nor in the number of its troops. The Medes and Perſians might have been rich-

er and more populous; but in nothing elſe did they reſemble Frenchmen.

Their ſucceſſes have already made them maſters of the Netherlands, a maritime country, and of all the left bank of the Rhine, which gives them the abſolute command of the navigation of that noble river. Their conqueſts have raiſed their population to near treble that of our three kingdoms together.

A decided ſuperiority over the Emperor, has enabled them to give a fatal blow to his power in Italy and the Empire; and their conduct on the whole has been ſuch, as convinced us we were too premature in deſpiſing them.

We have all ſeen how wonderfully contrary to every human expectation, their ſuperiority in numbers has effectually counterbalanced their inferiority in every thing elſe; and how ſucceſsful a vigorous government has been in repulſing the firſt troops in the univerſe with an army compoſed of the moſt infamous, noiſy, and undiſciplined vagabonds.———Few could, in the year 1792, ſeriouſly imagine that a Directory compoſed of parricides and atheiſts, would ſoon after dictate law to Europe.

Their Revolution upon the whole has been the moſt awful event in the hiſtory of the world. Popular in its commencement, from the

the advantages which it foreboded.——Abominable in its progreſs, from the crimes which it ſanctioned.——Formidable in its concluſion, from the danger with which it threatens Europe.

No advantages it can in the remoteſt ages produce, will ever compenſate for the miſeries it has occaſioned; and it is moſt ſincerely to be hoped, and devoutly to be prayed, that it may ſerve all future ages as a ſalutary example of deteſtation.

While I abhor from my ſoul the infamous cruelties which the French have perpetrated, I admire their efforts to eſtabliſh their independence, and their magnanimity in repelling foreign danger, while expoſed themſelves to the deepeſt diſtreſs. They will leave poſterity a memorable example of outward ſplendor and inward miſery.

Such are our *enemies*.——Let us now conſider our *friends*.

All theſe *friends* have ſucceſſively and treacherouſly abandoned us except Auſtria; the fidelity of which, claims our gratitude, and the heroic valour of whoſe troops our admiration. Deſerted by thoſe whoſe battles they fought; betrayed by thoſe to whoſe ſupport they had every claim; encompaſſed by every difficulty,

they have already maintained an unequal conteſt of five murderous campaigns in defence of an empire which abandoned them. Elated by no triumph, diſcouraged by no defeat; often victorious, often vanquiſhed, but ever formidable.

The cowardice of Spain, and the treachery of Pruſſia, it is to be hoped, will ſooner or later meet the puniſhment they have merited. Elevated from obſcurity by the greateſt of Kings, Pruſſia has ſeen herſelf poſſeſſed of an influence in the middle of the eighteenth century, which is rapidly declining in its concluſion. Like Thebes, her glory was born with her hero, and with him it expired.

Thus is the Britiſh empire upon the point perhaps of being left to carry on the war by itſelf, and France at liberty to employ againſt us at leaſt 100,000 of its beſt troops, who know no other occupation but bloodſhed and ſlaughter. The following ſhort calculations will ſhew the proportion our ſtrength bears to that of our enemy:

I. Price of labour and proviſions one half.
II. Population, - $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 1.
III. Army, - 3 to 1.
IV. The beſt artillery in the world.

This

This computation, which is rather moderate, clearly ſhews the natural ſtrength of France to be now nearly double at leaſt our own: and appears to be the more alarming, as together with this natural ſtrength ſhe has of late diſplayed a vigor, of which upon former occaſions ſhe was deemed incapable.

The moſt eloquent of our hiſtorians obſerves, that the empire of the ſea will not always ſecure Britain from conqueſt. Yet this remark, which ſhould be obvious to every one who conſiders that our ſea-ports are open towns without fortifications or batteries, is ſtill combated by prejudice, by ignorance, and by folly. The operations of a fleet depend upon the weather, and are of courſe uncertain. A ſtorm ſuddenly ariſing ſcattered the Spaniſh armada: another, equally fortunate for us, diſperſed the French fleet which lately ſailed towards our coaſts. Who can promiſe that upon future occaſions the elements ſhall be ſo favourable to us?

I have already taken it for granted, that the continuance of the war will produce an invaſion from France; and that the Theatre of this invaſion ſhall be Ireland. The motives of my belief are but too obvious. I ſhall now make ſome obſervations upon the preſent ſtate of Ireland, and afterwards proceed to point out what, in my opinion, would be the proper methods of carrying on the war in this country,

try, if we ſhould have the misfortune to be driven to that neceſſity.

If Ireland has not profited by the remembrance of paſt misfortunes; if the experience of former times has not ſhewn the people of this country the neceſſity of unanimity in the moment of common danger, it will unanſwerably prove the exiſtence of an evil deſtiny, which conducts nations, as well as individuals, to inevitable ruin.* We have hitherto upon every occaſion exhibited a melancholy inſtance of this. Our anceſtors have had the ſingular and almoſt unprecedented calamity of being the only people recorded in hiſtory, who could not renounce their private intereſts and animoſities when it became ever ſo indiſpenſible for their ſafety, and who, with an obſtinacy almoſt incredible, ſacrificed their independence rather than abate their prejudices.

A few examples taken from its hiſtory will very powerfully illuſtrate this obſervation.

I. Ireland was firſt governed by a number of barbarians who called themſelves kings, and

* Obſerve what Voltaire remarks of the Iriſh: "Les "Irlandais que nous avons vu de ſi bons ſoldats en France "et en Eſpagne out toujours mal combattu chez eux. Il y "a des nations dont l'une ſemble faite, pour etre ſoumis ea "l'autre."

Siecle de Louis XIV. tom 2. p. 57. Ed. Gen.

who,

who, by perpetual depredations upon each other's territories, depopulated and rendered miſerable the whole iſland.

II. In conſequence of this diſunion, Ireland was conquered by an Engliſh nobleman at the head of an incredibly ſmall force, and with much more eaſe than South America by the Spaniards.

III. A wretched military force kept all Ireland (though ever rebelling) for ſome centuries in ſubjection.

IV. We may ſtill conſider how Cromwell, with a very ſmall force, ſubdued this kingdom. The Iriſh army (and there was one) never as much as offered him battle. A Pope's nuncio furniſhed with holy oils, relics of ſaints, and bulls of parchment, had the entire kingdom at his command, while Ormond and Clanrickarde, with all their patriotiſm, were treated with contempt and ignominy.

To what ſhall we aſcribe theſe ſtrange facts ſo diſhonourable at firſt view to the national character?——That all Europeans are nearly upon an equal footing by Nature in point of courage, is generally allowed; and the conduct of our countrymen, upon a multiplicity of occaſions which no one can diſpute, aſſigns them a place among the firſt troops in Europe. But

all

all their heroiſm has been diſplayed, all their laurels acquired in defending every country but their own.

From the ſingular ſituation of Ireland in former times, perhaps we might venture to account for the deplorable diviſion which then reigned among its inhabitants.

I. The ſubjection in which one part of the nation kept the other.

II. The difference of Religion.

III. The difference of language, manners, and many other things, which, though apparently trifling, contribute more than any thing to engender a national antipathy.

The queſtion now is, "Whether theſe three capital cauſes, or any of them, continue to operate or not at the preſent time?"

The ſubjection in which one part of Ireland held the other, is now leſs felt by far than formerly; as the ſpirit of toleration has at length admitted the Catholics nearly to an equality of privileges with the Proteſtants. The capital privilege of ſitting in Parliament, would, in my opinion, add but little weight to the Catholic intereſt; as the number of that perſuaſion, who poſſeſs fortunes adequate to become

Repreſen-

Repreſentatives, is very ſmall when compared to the Proteſtants.

The difference of Religion, one ſhould think, would ſcarce be felt in Ireland, eſpecially ſince the French Revolution. We hear nothing echoed throughout the kingdom, and by all parties ſince the period of the volunteer aſſociations, but Proteſtant united with Catholic, charity, tolerance, and ſimilar topics.

In what the diſcontents of the people of Ulſter have originated, I know not: in what they ſhall terminate, I am equally ignorant. The ſubject which I have undertaken to treat, indiſpenſibly requires that I ſhould be a favourer of no party, but point out to all their common intereſts at a criſis ſo alarming as the preſent.

If the claims of the northern people are juſt, they ſhould be granted. If falſe, whatever their threats may be, rejected. In either caſe it is to be lamented, that they ſhould adhere to them with ſuch obſtinacy in a moment ſo replete with danger.

There never has been, I believe, a government of whatever ſhape or form, without its defects. Nor do I think ſuch a government can exiſt. Contentment and happineſs belong not to human nature. That the conſtitution

of Britain has its defects, is what I will not pretend to diſpute. It is a wonderful and convincing proof of it, that one of our nobleſt privileges, the Liberty of the Preſs, is at ſuch periods as the preſent the moſt deſtructive to us.

This unbounded licentiouſneſs (for I can never call it the liberty) of the preſs, under the ſpecious appearances of patriotiſm, cauſes the worſt conſequences in this country. There is a numerous claſs of men, who with ſavage exultation relate the ſucceſſes of our enemies, while they are ſilent with reſpect to our own; and infuſe a poiſonous deſpondency in the minds of the people, by a malicious exaggeration of the force and reſources of the one, while they ſtudiouſly undervalue thoſe of the other. No government, antient or modern, but our own, has ſuffered ſuch inſults to paſs with impunity.

The moſt indiſpenſible meaſures which government can adopt; the moſt brilliant exploits which our armaments can atchieve, become alike the objects of their ſpleen and their cenſure. Upon other occaſions ſuch conduct could only excite contempt; but it now kindles indignation.

The liberty of the preſs when properly managed, effectually chaſtiſes Vice and expoſes Folly:

Folly: when improperly uſed, it only calumniates Innocence, magnifies Danger, excites Diſtruſt, and expoſes our Secrets to the enemy. Such are the purpoſes for which it now ſerves.

The inſupportable audacity with which modern libellers charge Miniſters with the moſt obnoxious meaſures, equally evinces their ignorance and folly. The Standard of Sedition is openly erected under the pretext of Patriotiſm, and Incorruptibility at the very moment where Loyalty is moſt needed. Every inſinuation which malice can ſuggeſt; every accuſation which diſappointed ambition can raiſe, is thrown out in order to blacken the character of adminiſtration, by a faction the loweſt and moſt contemptible in the nation.

If it requires impudence equal to theirs to propagate theſe calumnies, it requires malice equal to theirs to believe them. The deſtruction of our fleets and armies; the loſs of our colonies; the unneceſſary accumulation of national debt, are painted in all the glowing colours of rhetoric, in order to afford us a more poignant ſenſe of our misfortunes. From peruſing half the public papers one would imagine that the Authors really believed our Miniſters, like thoſe of Conſtantinople, had the *deſtruction* of the people for their fixed object.

I muſt farther lament the epicurean degeneracy, the faſhionable vices of folly and extravagance, which are daily becoming more prevalent among us. Little do our people of rank imagine how fatal theſe genuine nurſeries of cowardice and effeminacy are to a people who aſpire to glory, and who profeſs themſelves determined not to ſurvive their honor and independence.

While the ſoldier who has bled for his country, perhaps in every quarter of the globe, leads among us a life of indigence and miſery, often of contempt, we affix wonderful merit to a common-place harangue on liberty, which often falls infinitely ſhort, both in language and ſentiment, to the daily rhapſodies of a newſpaper.

The military profeſſion, whatever may be ſaid to the contrary, is the guardian and the bulwark of every ſtate. It is the only field wherein true glory can be acquired. Yet ſtrange as it may ſeem, one would imagine it was conſigned among us only to people of low and deſperate fortunes. Inſtead of noblemen of rank being ambitious to diſtinguiſh themſelves againſt the enemies of their country, one cannot without indignation hear even the friends of an enſign, whoſe regiment is ordered on foreign ſervice, charge him with impru-

imprudence for embarking becauſe he is heir to the humble patrimony of 300*l.* per ann.— It muſt be a wretched people indeed, who prefer riches to glory, or among whom wealth exempts a man from the duties of ſociety.

I know that Ireland does not correſpond altogether with this deſcription. The behaviour of the people upon the late memorable attempt to invade us, gave a very favourable promiſe of a contrary conduct. But it labours under an evil ſtill more dreadful in its conſequences, and which threatens, if not ſpeedily remedied, the moſt fatal effects. This evil is the ſpirit of Democracy, and equality of Rights and Privileges, which the American and French Revolutions have rendered the favourite topics of diſcuſſion among the lower claſſes of people, particularly in the north of Ireland. Emerging from the ſuperſtition of their anceſtors, they have at once fallen into an oppoſite extreme, and are agitated by principles which, plauſible as they may appear, are perhaps more deſtructive in their conſequences, than the bigotry which, though the very oppoſite in theory, they ſtrongly reſemble in practice.

But the people of diſcontented principles in Ireland ſeem wholly to have forgotten, that the queſtion is not now, *whether by the aid of the French they ſhall obtain the rights they deſire?* But,

whether

whether or not Ireland ſhall be reduced as a province of France?

The impoſſibility of Ireland, particularly in her preſent ſtate, maintaining a total independence amid ſuch powerful neighbours, is obvious to every perſon. The alarming danger which threatens that of every country in Europe, from the enormous power of France, renders the union of this country with Great Britain daily more neceſſary. This truth was never before ſo obvious; and it is therefore very aſtoniſhing that greater precautions are not taken againſt the poſſibility of our conqueſt.

The conqueſt of Ireland and its annexation to France muſt infallibly produce that of England, then deprived of a multitude of excellent ſoldiers and ſailors, of proviſions for her fleets and colonies, &c. France in poſſeſſion of all the harbours in this country, infinitely better than thoſe of the ſiſter kingdom; advantageouſly ſituated upon the Atlantic, and able to invade England when it pleaſed, might ſoon create the firſt navy in the univerſe. In a word, England ſituated between Ireland and France, muſt yield upon the firſt attack which thoſe two countries united made upon her.

If the people of Ireland are ſo diſcontented as they are repreſented, the conſequences of an invaſion muſt be horrible. Let us ſuppoſe the

French

French upon their landing are joined by ſome thouſands of the peaſantry; upon ſuch an occaſion one half of Ireland, aſſiſted by the invaders, will enter the field againſt the other half, ſeconded by no contemptible Iriſh army, and by formidable reinforcements from England.——What carnage!—what deſolation!—what famine muſt enſue in a conteſt between men fighting in a deſperate rebellion upon the one ſide, and men fighting for their lives, their properties, and their independence upon the other!———Such a conteſt would not ſo ſpeedily be terminated as ſome may imagine.

Ireland contains near four millions of people. Of theſe I will allow without ſcruple, that ſeven-eights are reduced to the greateſt poſſible miſery from cauſes into which it is not my duty to enquire. Thoſe who have ſeen the lower orders of people in the countries upon the continent, which we with exultation call deſpotic, will readily acknowledge that the condition of the ſame order in Ireland cannot be worſe than it is. This deplorable miſery has utterly broke the ſpirit of the peaſantry in our ſouthern and weſtern provinces. They are timid, impatient, unwarlike, and roguiſh. In travelling through them, one is aſtoniſhed at the vaſt numbers of tall handſome men he meets with, who live both as to food and raiment in the very laſt ſtage of human miſery, and yet cannot be prevailed

vailed upon to enliſt as ſoldiers. When enliſted they would ſeek for nothing but an opportunity to deſert.

The people of the North on the contrary, were their loyalty to be depended on, would be a pattern of courage, patience, and induſtry. It is truly unfortunate that it is upon that province we muſt principally rely for ſoldiers.

Having granted ſo much upon the one ſide, I would now willingly demand upon the other, if the diſtreſſes of the peaſantry in Ireland would be meliorated by their becoming ſubjects of France, where we have been long familiarized with ſcenes of cruelty and injuſtice?—Where the inflammatory harangue of a demagogue has ſo often involved the innocent and the guilty in one common ruin.

Can the people of Ireland be the more happy by aboliſhing that inequality of condition, which, however unjuſt in the theory of governments, is ſo indiſpenſible in its practice?

What more beautiful idea than that of the equality of all men? What more dreadful calamities than thoſe which reſult from its execution?

The antient Legiſlators paid the utmoſt regard to reaſon, and were men of the moſt incorruptible

corruptible virtue. Their ideas of Government were all regulated by the ſpeculations of philoſophers, having then no other light to guide them; but they found that equality was too repugnant to Nature to be practicable, and the governments which they founded, notwithſtanding all the care which they took to the contrary, all ſubſided in deſpotiſm.

We have lately ſeen the politeſt people in Europe, on the abolition of their government, commit barbarities ſcarce known among ſavage nations:—What could be expected from one of the moſt rude peaſantries in Europe in a ſimilar ſituation, unreſtrained by authority, and headed by men of the moſt deſperate fortunes and profligate principles?

The gentry of Ireland ſhould reflect upon the awful poſition in which they now ſtand. They ſhould conſider the conſequences which muſt follow from the French and the democratic faction being maſters of the kingdom. The ſavage fury of barbariſm, the unrelenting ſpirit of revenge, now ſmothered by a ſalutary fear of authority, would, upon ſuch an event, inſtantly diſplay itſelf, and but too ſtrongly mark its progreſs by the moſt diſmal rapine, murder, and deſolation. The rulers of the leading factions, after having ſatiated their ferocity in exterminating thoſe who are now their ſuperiors,

would turn their rage againſt each other, as has been done in France; and Ireland muſt rapidly relapſe into that ſtate of barbariſm and miſery, from which ſhe has for ſome centuries been ſo ſlowly emerging.

The faſhionable jargon of profeſſions of attachment to our Conſtitution, and of ſacrificing life and property in its defence, avail nothing in defending Ireland againſt an enemy. Theſe are mere words which have long loſt their effect from the frequency of their repetition. Let the gentry of the kingdom, plainly ſeeing its revenues are inadequate to its emergency upon the preſent occaſion, come forward, and by a voluntary gift of ſo many *per cent.* upon their eſtates, enable Government to put the country in a reſpectable ſtate of defence. Then, and not till then, I will be convinced of their ſtedfaſt reſolution to ſave their country, or bury themſelves under its ruins.

I ſhall conclude theſe obſervations by reiterating the dangerous conſequences with which the exorbitant power of France threatens the liberties of Europe. In fact, it ſeems in a manner to depend wholly upon the French themſelves, by an indefatigable perſeverance in the ſcheme of ſelf-aggrandizement like the Romans, to ſecure themſelves a power which will finally abſorb that of the other ſtates of Europe, unleſs

leſs theſe ſtates are always ſo ſenſible of their own danger, as to oppoſe to the moſt trifling effort, which the French can make in the proſecution of that plan, the moſt vigorous reſiſtance.

Shall Fate however have decreed, that the French Revolution is to deſtroy the balance of power maintained in Europe for near three centuries, temporary remedies only can be applied for an evil which it is impoſſible radically to cure; and like a patient, to whom ſlow poiſon has been adminiſtered, to defer the evil moment of diſſolution as long as poſſible.

I Shall now proceed to the defence of Ireland againſt an invaſion; an event for which every circumſtance ſhould exhort us to prepare.

The Art of War is above all others the moſt difficult to be reduced to any regular ſyſtem; as it chiefly depends upon the abilities or the fortune of a General. It is true, that the ſcience of attack and defence is reduced to a ſyſtem in the countries which border Bohemia, Sileſia, and Saxony. The ſame may be ſaid of the banks of the Rhine, from Huningen to Bingen, and from thence over Treves, Luxemburg and Namur to Dunkirk. But there is ſcarce a plain in any of theſe countries on

which a battle has not been fought, nor a field which has not been ſprinkled with human blood: ſo that the experience of centuries may well teach modern generals to proceed in ſuch a beaten track.

But in Ireland our inſular ſituation and other circumſtances muſt render the operations of a war very different from thoſe on the continent; particularly ſo, as no regular war (according to the modern acceptation of the term) has hitherto been carried on in this country. Few of our officers or ſoldiers have ever beheld the operations of a large army. It is to be hoped, the peculiar ſituation of the country will equally bewilder an enemy when he comes to invade us. In treating ſuch a ſubject, we can argue from probabilities, not facts; a circumſtance which ſhould always render us more cautious in our aſſertions.

A plan of attack and defence may be formed in the imagination of an Author, and may appear extremely plauſible. But were the Author to have an opportunity of putting his plan into execution, he would perhaps find himſelf miſerably deceived by the reſult of his ſpeculations*.

Fully

* Of all the works, antient or modern, which treat of the Art of War, the late King of Pruſſia's "*Inſtructions to his Generals*" is, in my opinion, the moſt valuable. The other works

Fully ſenſible of this, I ſhall avoid as much as poſſible entering into minute details of the *probable* operations of two hoſtile armies in Ireland; and reduce all my efforts to four grand points, which ought to be more attended to, in my opinion, than they are.

I. The improvement of our diſcipline.

II. The encreaſe of our fighting men, and the leſſening of their encumbrances on a march.

III. The immediate inſtitution of a corps of rifleмen and of pontoniers.

works upon tactics (and they are numberleſs in every language) are in general only wretched compilations made by men who have no knowledge of the art, and which only impoſe upon the vulgar and ignorant, by the plauſibility of their plans, and the confidence of their aſſertions.

There have even been writers not military men, who have derived fame from treating of the Art of War. Machiavel's Treatiſe upon that ſubject has been highly admired, though he had never ſeen a ſhot fired. He had, however, the prudence to reſiſt all the ſolicitations of his patron the Duke of Urbin, to accept the command of a battalion leaſt he ſhould expoſe himſelf to the ridicule of his ſoldiers.

I am not at all ſurprized at Machiavel's Treatiſe being highly admired by the Italian veterans. They were even then greater cowards than at preſent: for they fought battles from morning till night, without a man being killed or wounded on either ſide, and then came into their cities to receive the compliments of the ladies for their heroiſm, and ſing te Deum.

IV. The

IV. The improvement of our artillery, for whoſe operations this country is ſo well adapted, and by which it is more than probable the conteſt will be decided, &c.

Let us ſuppoſe the preſent army in Ireland to be compoſed as follows:

Cavalry,	11 Regiments,	4,200
Artillery,	1 Regiment, -	1,500
Infantry,	58 Battalions, about	30,000
	Total	35,700 men*.

There are about 300 braſs howitzers and cannon of every calibre under 12lb. Fifty-two battalions have two field pieces attached to each, which diſtributes 104 through the line. But by the above ſtatement we may perceive, that there are neither pontoniers nor riflemen, two articles without which it is in vain for an army to take the field†. Our corps of engineers is entirely too trifling to be included in my ſtatement. If it could be of conſequence, it muſt

* Viz. 38 regiments of militia, 20 regiments of fencibles, 4 of dragoon guards, 5 of dragoons, and 2 of fencible cavalry.

There are beſides ſix regular regiments and three of Iriſh Brigades, but they are ſkeletons, none of them amounting to 300 men.

† There are ſome pontoons in Dublin, but not in ſufficient quantity, nor are there pontoniers.

derive

derive it from the rare abilities and the merit of its preſent chief.

The preſent forces of this kingdom are not, it is evident, fully adequate to its defence. The preſent danger is ſo great, that it will decide our fate for ever. Our only way to meet danger with confidence is, to put our army upon as reſpectable a footing as it is capable of. The man who forewarns the country of its danger, is its friend, not its enemy.

The period of the ſervice of a great part of our militia approaches. Let Government beware of diſcharging them. Their place will not readily be ſupplied; and if diſaffected, they are ſo many fighting men to recruit the enemy's ſtrength. Let the augmentation of companies from 70 to 100 take place as ſpeedily as poſſible. A recruit among old ſoldiers will in three weeks fully know his duty. Our artillery would alſo require vaſt improvement*.

I would ſtrongly recommend it to have our army immediately inſtructed in the grand manœuvre, by being taught to perform their evolutions in large bodies. The deficiency of our

* We may obſerve how curiouſly the different branches of the art of war have in their turns preponderated. Till within the two laſt centuries cavalry decided every battle. Since that, all was effected by the diſcipline of the infantry. Both now yield to the cannon.

Officers

Officers in this moſt important particular, will be but too ſtrongly felt hereafter, if now neglected. †

Twenty thouſand of our beſt troops, cavalry, infantry and artillery, might be encamped together; and inſtructed in every evolution which is performed in face of an enemy.

The cavalry might be practiſed in leaping ſtone walls and ditches in different formations, ſo indiſpenſibly neceſſary in ſuch a country as this; in attacks in cloſe and open forms; in reconnoitering, foraging, falſe alarms, &c. &c.

† Various are the definitions given of the term "good officer." It ſeems in general to be miſtaken for what is called a martinet, viz. a man ſcrupulouſly ſtrict in parading, powdering, and dreſſing his ſoldiers; mercileſs in puniſhments, regular in inſpections, &c. &c.

But in my humble opinion the excellence of an officer does not lie within the above particulars. Vigilance, humanity, a temperate courage, a knowledge of the ſubſiſtence of an army, and the diſpoſal of its quarters, a general idea of the movements of a large army, are the principal traits in a valuable officer's character.

I once heard a celebrated General ſay, that out of ten ſtrict parade diſciplinarians, he had ſcarce ever obſerved one make a conſpicuous figure againſt the enemy. His obſervation, I believe, is in general a juſt one. For he that is great in little things, is commonly little in great things. But were all officers to conſider themſelves above ſmall details, it would ruin an army. Fortunately few are born to be generals.

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The infantry might be taught to move in columns; to *deploy* with exactneſs; to attack upon a plain; to the attack and defence of redoubts and villages; covering retreats; paſſing rivers in advancing and retiring.

The artillery might be advantageouſly inſtructed in firing with more exactneſs than expedition; in moving with velocity with the cavalry and infantry; in firing when advancing and retreating.

It is obvious how infinitely our army will improve by ſuch regulations; and how vaſtly the ideas of our officers will expand upon ſuch a difficult ſubject as that of war, by being taught the evolutions which are practiſed in the day of battle. It will call to the minds of our generals, ſcenes which many of them have ſeen in their younger days.

The Weſt India iſlands and America, replete as they may be with danger, are not the ſchools in which the art of war may be learned with advantage. No more idea can be formed of the manœuvres of 40 or 50,000 men, from thoſe of two or three regiments, than of a three-decker from a ferry-boat.

Where our All is at ſtake, as at preſent, no expence, even the moſt enormous, ſhould be ſpared to put our military eſtabliſhment upon a

formidable footing. We expend immenſe ſums in conſtructing public buildings, bridges, roads, &c. through Ireland. The munificence of the people in theſe monuments of national vanity, forms a glaring contraſt with their parſimony in providing for their army. The embelliſhments of our capital, one would imagine, were intended not for ourſelves, but our enemies.

Our regiments are in general entirely too ſmall. Their proportion of officers and non-commiſſioned officers, is too great for that of the privates we can bring into the field. For inſtance, the proportion in a regiment of ten companies, even excluding the ſtaff, is as follows, viz.

Captains,	-	8
Lieutenants,	-	10
Enſigns,	-	8
Sergeants,	-	40
Corporals,	-	50
Non-effectives,		30
Drummers, &c.		20
Total,		166

Now if we conſider that this deficiency of ſtrength is principally felt among the privates, (and indeed it is among them that it is moſt important) and if to the above ſtatement are added

added the ſick, deſerted, and vacant, we can confidently aſſert, that no leſs than a fifth do not give fire in time of action. Our ſergeants are armed with pikes inſtead of muſkets; becauſe, I underſtand, it was objected that they amuſed themſelves with firing, inſtead of attending to the regularity of their platoons. This objection, I allow, was a juſt one when the ſergeant was put into line; a ſituation where few can reſtrain their impetuoſity. A method can however be taken, by which this may eaſily be prevented. In the Auſtrian ſervice the ſergeant carries a light muſket; when the line prepares to fire, he ſteps three paces in the rear with the covering officers and corporals, and is ready to ſhoot the firſt man that attempts to fly before the enemy. I would recommend the ſame plan here, where we have four times the proportion of ſergeants with the Auſtrians, though our companies are only one-fourth as ſtrong.* There are many occaſions upon which a ſergeant may uſe his muſket, ſuch as convoys, foraging, ſkirmiſhing, &c.

The next thing I would propoſe is, to diminiſh as much as poſſible the incumbrance of the ſoldier and the army upon the marches. We cannot too highly value the advantages

* This clearly ſhews how cautious we ſhould be, not to diminiſh the number of our fighting men by the example of that brilliant ſervice. They have only one ſergeant to a company, which is indeed ſufficient.

which refult from the rapidity of our move-ments.

I would give the ſoldier the articles neceſſary for his comfort, but no more. When encumbered with ſuperfluities he is fatigued by a few miles march, and ſpiritleſs upon the day of battle.

A tin kettle for each meſs ſhould be carried by each man in his turn on a march, and not left behind with the baggage, which often arrives ſome hours after the army halts, particularly in rainy weather.

I would ſtrongly recommend it not to encumber our ſoldiers with blankets. They ought to remain with the baggage; nothing is more unmilitary than to ſee men mount guard with them. A watch coat is full ſufficient to cover a man*.

All

* The following articles, and their weight annexed, would be ſufficient, viz.

	lb.	*oz.*
A traverſack of painted canvas, (goat ſkin breeds vermin) weighing about	3	0
A ſhirt, (beſides the one he wears,)	1	8
Stockings, one pair, ditto,	0	8
Geaters, ditto,	1	0
Shoes, ditto,	1	0
A watch coat,	10	0
200 rounds, at leaſt, of ammunition,	16	0
Total,	33	0

Blankets

All females, if poſſible, ſhould be left at home, except at furtheſt two to each company, in order to ſell whiting, &c. and waſh the ſoldier's linen: even that, he ſhould learn to do himſelf. The wives may receive a maintainance from government during the abſence of their huſbands. It is abſolutely painful to a man, who has ever ſeen any regular diſcipline, to perceive how much our regiments are encumbered on their march by wives, children, and miſtreſſes, and what an immenſity of large cheſts, bandboxes, tea-kettles, earthenware, &c. they bring with them, which would require double the number of horſes otherwiſe ſufficient. A multitude of women in an army cauſes every ſpecies of impropriety and breach of diſcipline. Idleneſs, theft, conſumption of proviſions, quarrelling, and venereal diſeaſes in abundance, by no means fill up the catalogue of female attendance in a camp.

The general ſhould expel with ignominy every profligate female who ſhould appear within the camp.

The officers ſhould be careful to ſhew an example of chaſtity to their ſoldiers. No officer

Blankets breed vermin, to which the ſoldier is but too much inclined in camp. When any of the above articles are defective, new ones can be procured by order of the captain of each company.

ſhould

ſhould preſume to puniſh a ſoldier for faults of which he himſelf is guilty.

Ireland from its ſtone walls, hedges, bogs and mountains, is peculiarly adapted to the operations of light troops, particularly infantry. A war here will be almoſt entirely ſkirmiſhes and cannonading. But if we employ our light battalions in the former ſervice, we ſhall ſoon loſe the flower of our troops, and reduce our infantry to nothing, even without loſing a battle. It is impoſſible for all the infantry we have to ſpare men ſufficient for the outpoſts.

Might not the following plan be executed in raiſing a corps of rifiemen?

Let us ſuppoſe 500 gentlemen of fortune, and in government intereſt. Theſe can eaſily procure upon their eſtates, each four men on an average, who are expert markſmen, and of approved fidelity. Let theſe 2000 men be formed into two or four battalions, and officered from the line. Their diſcipline is eaſy, becauſe they are ſuppoſed to know the principal part of it already. The outline of the expence attending ſuch a corps, is, according to my calculation, as follows, viz.

2000

2000 ſtand of arms, at 2l. -	£. 4000
—— Uniforms, blue or green, at 3l.	6000
Bounty, ſuppoſe 3l. - -	6000
	£. 16000

I venture with confidence to aſſert, that moderate ſum will ſave to government what has coſt enormous expences. Let it be conſidered, that there are in Ireland ſome thouſands of men, whoſe only amuſement is to ramble over the mountains in ſearch of game. The advantages which may be derived from employing ſuch men againſt an enemy are obvious. They are all expert markſmen, and perfectly acquainted with the country.

In order to facilitate the movements of our army, it will be further neceſſary to have at leaſt 150 pontoons.

The rivers in Ireland, though in general not very broad, are often rapid and dangerous. Thoſe which take their riſe in mountains (as almoſt all of them do) ſwell prodigiouſly upon very ſlight rains.

Suppoſe an army operates on the banks of one of thoſe rivers, how is it to paſs or repaſs before an enemy without pontoons? In advancing upon one column, it riſks being fallen upon and routed before it has formed upon the oppoſite

oppoſite ſide. Suppoſe we give battle with a river in our rear, and that the enemy breaks down its bridges, what is to be our lot if we have the misfortune to be defeated? Our cavalry may partly eſcape, but all the reſt muſt be taken or deſtroyed by the enemy for want of ſo trifling a precaution as a few miſerable pontoons.*

The rivers which lie in the places moſt likely to become the theatre of war in Ireland, are in general deep.

In Connaught the Shannon and Suck, are almoſt every where of conſiderable depth.

In Munſter the Lee and the Blackwater, are deep and rapid rivers.

Ulſter is full of lakes and rivers.

In order to paſs a river in preſence of an enemy, the more bridges which can be thrown over it the better. The uſual allowance of pontoons is about 1 to 2 fathoms.

They muſt be of two kinds, viz. thoſe for the cavalry and artillery muſt be about 20 feet

* The late King of Pruſſia broke down all the bridges in rear of the Ruſſian army before the battle of Zorndorff, Auguſt 1758. But perhaps his precaution, by rendering his enemy deſperate, prevented his obtaining a complete victory upon that memorable day.

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in length, with a proportional breadth and depth; thoſe for the infantry may be about 12 feet long and 5 in breadth. Each is moored to an anchor with a ſtrong hawſer, ſo that it may riſe and fall with the tide. In rapid currents the bridge ſhould be in the form of an angle, the better to reſiſt.

They are tranſported on carriages, each drawn by four horſes. The total expence of this eſtabliſhment I calculate as follows, viz.

Great pontoons,	50 at 40l.	£. 2000
Small ditto,	100 at 25l.	2500
Carriages,	100 at 30l.	3000
Horſes,	400 at 10l.	4000
Total,		£. 11,500

There will, in my opinion, be no neceſſity to form any *regular* corps of pontoniers for this ſervice. It may be performed by detachments of militia, who may, if exerciſed, ſoon learn to throw a bridge with dexterity.

I ſhall in the next place proceed to offer ſome hints upon the means which may be adopted, to put our principal branch, the artillery, upon a better footing; though it muſt ſtill be long inferior to that of the enemy.

The cannon of each regiment is now manned by a ſubaltern and thirty privates. Each gun is under the direction of an artillery man. This I by no means approve of. The command is too important for the guidance of an illiterate, inexperienced private. A ſubaltern or an intelligent ſergeant of artillery would perform this duty much better.

In order to remedy as much as poſſible the inexperience of theſe officers, I would ſtrongly recommend it to have inſtructions printed and ſent to the ſubaltern, attached to the battalion guns.* Theſe orders ſhould be as conciſe as poſſible,

* It might not be improper for theſe young artillery officers to know the following particulars, which have been laid down by the moſt experienced generals in that line.

1. The moſt expert of your canoniers ſhould be ſelected to load and point the gun.

2. No more than 5 or 6 round ſhot are to be fired each minute: more may be fired, and contribute to a more terrible cannonading, but nine-tenths of them will not affect the enemy. With grape ſhot, on the contrary, fire as quick as you can. Every ſhot will then do execution.

3. Where the enemy is within range of your ſhot, fire as obliquely on them as poſſible. A perpendicular ſhot may kill one or two men at moſt; an oblique ſhot will kill ſeveral.

4. When you act in a plain covered with ſtones, fire at theſe ſtones, ſhort of the enemy, among whom the ſplinters will do conſiderable execution.

Avoid

poſſible, and yet contain an outline of every thing neceſſary to be known by an artillery officer on ſervice. The careful peruſal of ſuch

 a paper

5. Avoid firing when the enemy is either much above or below you. Elevation and depreſſion are equally uncertain.

6. People have been aſtoniſhed at heights, defended by formidable batteries, being often ſtormed without much loſs. This was becauſe the ſides of the hill were ſo hollow, that the fire of the cannon paſſed over the heads of the aſſailants as they were advancing. When a hollow lies before your cannon, it ſhould be enfiladed by the batteries upon your flank.

7. The artillery acts moſt effectually by batteries. When divided among the line the effect is upon each battalion, and is eaſily remedied by cloſing up the ranks. But when entire diviſions and platoons are torn away, a diſmay ſeizes the boldeſt troops, and an opening is made among them, which enables the cavalry to pour down upon them with ſucceſs. Three or four batteries in front of a line will, if properly ſerved, effectually decide the victory. The battalions need not fear being the more expoſed by being deprived of their guns. The cloſer the enemy advances to them, the more they are expoſed to *enfilade* from our batteries.

8. In fighting the French, whoſe artillery is ſo formidable, their cannon muſt in general be aimed at, in order to diſmount them or kill their artillery men. But if their line advances with rapidity, the troops muſt be fired at, as it will create greater conſternation.

9. When the enemy advances or halts within your range, fire ſhort of him, as the ball will bound into his ranks. When

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a paper will ſoon make him tolerably intelligent in his duty.

I would recommend an immediate reinforcement of a hundred braſs cannon and fifty howitzers to be brought over from England. The calibre of theſe I would propoſe to be as follows, viz.

Cannon,	*lb.* 18 (field)	20	
	12 ditto,	20	
	9 ditto,	20	
	6 (battal.)	22	
	6 (flying)	18	
			100
Howitzers,	8 inch,	20	
	5½ ditto,	30	
	Total,		150

he retires, fire over him. It will encreaſe his confuſion and prevent his rallying, &c. &c.

A well ſerved artillery contributes at all times, particularly of late, more than any thing to the deciſion of a battle. But in order to have the battalion guns of the army upon any good footing, the moſt intelligent ſubalterns, and the beſt private men, ſhould be ſelected for the purpoſe. No expence whatever ſhould be ſpared in exerciſing and practiſing, in procuring horſes, and every other neceſſary, in many of which we are not by any means too well ſupplied.

The

The dreadful effect of howitzers in an action, is but too well known to every ſoldier of experience.

Mortars are of little or no uſe in a country like this, which has no fortifications.

With the above park of artillery I would import its neceſſary waggons, tumbrils, carts, drivers, ammunition and horſes, in order to prepare it for action at a moment's warning.

I would ſtrongly recommend it to government to form a corps of drivers. It would be dangerous to uſe thoſe we now employ againſt an enemy. In the moment of action their conſternation would undoubtedly put them to flight, not conſidering themſelves bound as ſoldiers, and might cauſe the loſs of a battle. The expence of ſuch a corps ſhall be treated hereafter.

If we expect to form an artillery, which we can with confidence oppoſe to that of our enemy, it will be abſolutely neceſſary that all the horſes employed to draw the cannon ſhould be accuſtomed to it regularly. Government ſhould purchaſe the number neceſſary; and indeed it is almoſt inconceivable why this meaſure has not already been adopted. Nothing ſurely can be more awkward and inconvenient than the

method

method now uſed in drawing our cannon. When a Brigade is ordered to march, the horſes are hired indiſcriminately from contractors, or on the march from the peaſantry. Such horſes being in general only accuſtomed to draw cars, can only proceed in a wretched ſlow pace. They each moment interrupt the progreſs of the line, and delay it in every town where a halt is made to procure a change of horſes. An officer cannot expect to leave a town before half the day is ſpent, for want of being able to procure horſes ſufficient for his convoy. By exerting himſelf he only creates the ill will of the country.

The conſequences of employing ſuch horſes to bring cannon into action muſt be dangerous. When the firing began they would inſtantly take fright, break their traces and diſperſe, leaving the artillery, if a retreat was ordered, in the enemy's hands.

It would ſurely be better to undergo ſome expence than endanger a total ruin of our artillery, by means of which *alone* we can ſave ourſelves from conqueſt. This expence will not be ſo great as may at firſt be imagined. The method now followed, though apparently ſaving, is in the concluſion the moſt expenſive. For inſtance, our artillery horſes have been paid at the enormous rate of four Engliſh ſhillings a-

day,

day, which in a month makes 6l. 14s. 4d. I am certain that the greateſt part of the horſes employed on that ſervice were not worth that ſum. At all events, had government purchaſed them, they might afterwards be ſold at near their original coſt, and their forage would not have amounted to any great expence.

I would recommend the immediate purchaſe of the horſes neceſſary for our field artillery, and to have the baggage and ammunition drawn by ordinary ones, which will anſwer ſufficiently well. The following is a general calculation of my intended Park, and the horſes which would be requiſite for the cannon and howitzers only. Thoſe which the waggons require, depend on our quantity of ammunition.

Howitzers,	8 inch	40	-	320	Horſes.
	5½ ditto,	55	-	220	
	4⅖ ditto,	12	-	36	
		107			576
Cannon,	18 lb.	20	-	240	Horſes.
	12 ditto,	60		480	
	9 ditto,	20	-	140	
	6 ditto,	130	-	390	
		337	Total,		1826

Conſidering

Conſidering that all battles have of late been decided by artillery, the above number of cannon is by no means too great to bring into the field againſt an enemy, unfortunately ſo ſuperior to us in that department. Care ſhould alſo be taken that we have abundance of ammunition. I know that it is extremely troubleſome to have too great a quantity with an army from the number of waggons and horſes it requires. But I am equally ſenſible of the more dangerous conſequences of having too little. More battles than one have been loſt by the failure of ammunition.* No leſs than 250 rounds a gun would, in my opinion, be ſufficient to bring with the cannon. Beſides this, a ſtrong magazine and laboratory ſhould always be at a convenient diſtance in rear of the army.

Beſides the above train I would divide the flying artillery into five brigades, each conſiſting of ten cannon 6lb. and two or three light howitzers. To each of theſe I would attach a ſmall brigade of cavalry to ſupport it. It is almoſt the only method in which we can make uſe of our horſe with effect.

One hundred rounds a gun will be ſufficient for the flying artillery, becauſe its tumbrils

* That of Torgau was in 1760 by the Auſtrians, according to the king of Pruſſia's own avowal.—See his poſthumous works, Vol. 3.

being

being lightly mounted, can bring a new ſupply from the magazines with much more eaſe than the ordinary waggons.

According to the uſual allowance, the number of horſes for the flying artillery will be for its cannon, howitzers, tumbrils, &c. 435 to the five brigades. This makes the entire number of horſes for pontoons and cannon to be as follows,

Field train,	- -	1826
Flying ditto,	-	435
Pontoons,	- -	400
	Total,	2661 Horſes.

Suppoſing the average price of each horſe to be 10l. that of the whole amounts conſequently to 26,610l. a ſum which will enable our artillery to act upon a regular and active footing.

To form a corps of drivers I would recommend it to collect and enliſt ſuch boys and carmen as are now diſperſed through the country (and there are vaſt numbers) without employment. A great many will be glad to obtain a permanent occupation, or at leaſt a means of ſupport, during the war. As this corps will only be abſolutely neceſſary for the cannon, by eſtimating one to every two horſes, the whole

number will be about 1330. As the ſervice of theſe drivers is not altogether ſo perilous as that of the military, their bounty might be trifling, and their pay the ſame with the infantry. They ſhould be furniſhed with an uniform.

In fact, neither the drivers nor the horſes now uſed in our artillery, are to be depended on; and whatever might be the expence of providing ourſelves with better, and putting our artillery upon a proper eſtabliſhment, it ought not be ſpared upon ſuch an occaſion as the preſent.

No relaxation ſhould take place in our exertions for defence, on account of the preſent rumour of peace. We have an inſidious foe to deal with, who will take every advantage which can poſſibly be derived from our fatal ſecurity.

That important part of the art of war, the ſubſiſtence of an army, is very much, I am ſorry to ſay, neglected, and but little underſtood in Ireland. Nothing can be more injudicious than for a large body of troops to depend upon a country, whatever its fertility may be, for its ſubſiſtence. Our ignorance in this particular ariſes from our not having ſeen large armies.

Let

Let us ſuppoſe thirty battalions and ſo many ſquadrons encamp together; in a few days they will conſume the produce of the moſt fertile country around them for ſeveral miles. Two conſequences muſt infallibly reſult from the want of magazines, both of which enſure defeat.

I. The army muſt divide itſelf into ſmall corps, in order to ſubſiſt itſelf, and conſequently be no where able to reſiſt the enemy; or,

II. So many foraging parties muſt be ſent out, and of ſuch ſtrength as will entirely weaken the army and encourage an attack from the enemy.

The magazines of an army ſhould contain proviſions and forage for at leaſt four months, with a certainty of being able to procure two or three months more proviſions at the expiration of that term. Without this it can never act with the neceſſary vigor or ſtrength.

I would recommend the immediate purchaſe of four month's proviſions for 30,000 men, viz. 27,000 infantry and 3000 horſe. According to the preſent allowance of hay, oats and ſtraw given to the cavalry, and the price of theſe articles, the forage of each horſe amounts to at furtheſt 9l. in that term, a much ſmaller ſum

than the enormous expence government now incurs in maintaining the cavelry.

The uſual allowance of the men's rations amounts in four months to 4l. This eſtimation may enable us to calculate the entire expence of a grand magazine as follows, viz.

Four month's forage for 3000 cavalry horſes, - - -	£. 27,000
——— ditto, for 2661 Artillery, ditto, - - -	23,949
Four month's proviſions for 30,000 men, - - -	120,000
——— ditto, for 2000 drivers, &c. &c. - -	8,000
Total,	£. 178,949

This, conſidering that there is a daily deduction of four-pence per man for his rations, is a very moderate ſum, conſidering the important purpoſes of its expenditure.

Forage can be purchaſed at a much cheaper rate at preſent, than when the ſeaſon is more advanced. In order to avoid the expence attending the purchaſe of proviſions, I would recommend it to government to make proviſional contracts for ſo many thouſand ſheep and oxen, ſo much flour, &c. the contracting parties

ties being bound to a reciprocal forfeiture in caſe the contract was not fulfilled.

Government can at all times leſſen the price of corn by an embargo, and a bounty upon importation. It can almoſt equally influence the price of the other neceſſaries.

Payments can be made with government debentures much more advantageouſly now, than when there may be an invaſion.

Was Ireland inhabited by an enterprizing commercial people, what advantages might there not be drawn from the innumerable bays and harbours which its weſtern ſhores preſent to the Atlantic? But this advantage which Nature has given it, together with the ſouth weſterly winds which prevail for the greater part of the year, lay it open unfortunately to every invader. Beſides, that the modern improvements upon the art of navigation enable one fleet to avoid another, is a fact of which the manœuvres of the French fleets during the preſent war have pretty clearly convinced us. Admitting this, it follows, that no *abſolute* reliance whatever can be placed upon the naval force which defends our coaſts, and that nothing enſures us from conqueſt but an army which we can with confidence confront with the greateſt force which an enemy can land in this country.

The

The part in which an enemy, in my opinion, would moſt likely land, is Galway. The bay is open ;—the town lies only ſix days march from Dublin ; the roads are excellent, and the country is almoſt a dead flat through which the march lies. It is truly fortunate for us, that our northern coaſt produces no harbours which might admit our foreign to join our domeſtic enemies.

It is a folly to conceal from the public the facility with which the invaſion of this country might be effected.

Two hundred and fifty tranſports will carry an army of 40,000 foot, 2000 horſe, and a proportional train of artillery and engineers, together with three month's proviſions. Three days fair wind, (which will alſo detain our fleet in the channel,) will waft them from Breſt to our coaſts. Let us ſuppoſe theſe 250 tranſports, eſcorted by 25 or 30 ſail of the line, who will without ſcruple hazard a battle. We are, it is true, better ſailors ; but ſhould their fleet be ſuperior to ours by four or five ſhips, are we ſtill ſure of the victory ?—What is the loſs of a few ſhips to a government which has already, in ſuch a multitude of inſtances, ſhewn us, that it will ſtop at nothing by which it can attain its deſired purpoſes ?

Let

Let us ſeriouſly conſider what troops the French can ſend to invade this country: let us diveſt ourſelves of that fooliſh national conceit which is prone to deſpiſe every thing but ourſelves. Let us be cautious in expecting to vanquiſh with eaſe, ſoldiers who have fought in ſuch a multitude of battles, the followers of Dumourier, of Pichegru and Buonoparte. Such ſoldiers, commanded by officers who have already foiled the diſciples and companions of Frederick the Great, of Daun and Laudon, will not be eaſily overcome by troops, one hundredth part of whom have never before ſeen actual ſervice.

The late attempt to invade us was by all accounts undertaken by no more than 17 or 18000 men, compoſed of an indifferent infantry, ſome diſmounted cavalry, and an artillery without horſes.

Finding themſelves miſtaken in their hopes of being received with open arms in this country, they may in future commit leſs miſtakes; they may learn to rely more upon their own exertions, and leſs upon our diſunion.

Inſtead of the trifling force which they lately ſent, they may now ſend treble that number, compoſed of troops who have already fought with ſucceſs at Jemappe and Fleurus. To prepare

pare our army, if poſſible, for oppoſing ſo formidable an enemy, is therefore our duty.

Every part of an iſland being almoſt equally liable to attack, its principal force ought to be collected in its center. The ſureſt method of defending Ireland would be, to place an army, which can in a very ſhort ſpace of time oppoſe a conſiderable force to the enemy in any part of the coaſt, and eſtabliſh magazines for the ſupport of that army.

I am not over ſolicitous about the preſervation of the capital. A capital has often been taken by an enemy, without the country being loſt by it.* If we are maſters of the field, we can, at our leiſure, make ourſelves maſters of Dublin. If we divide our forces to defend it, we may for ſome time ſucceed; but by leaving the field of battle to the enemy, we muſt alſo abandon the metropolis in the end.

The internal police of the country I would leave to the yeomanry, to join whom might be ſpared ſome regular light cavalry. All convoys above three days march from the army, I would alſo have eſcorted by them. Our regular forces muſt be weakened as little as poſſible. But when a convoy is nearer, a ſtrong force of

* Berlin was in poſſeſſion of the Auſtrians and Ruſſians in 1760.

horſe,

horſe, foot and artillery ſhould guard it againſt attack.

To defend Ireland effectually will require no leſs than 40,000 *effective** men; and even this army, capable of being reinforced from England, together with above 300 pieces of cannon. Such a force will, in all human probability, enable us to defeat the largeſt force an enemy can invade us with; becauſe Ireland is too confined a theatre for large armies either to act or ſubſiſt on.

Of the above I would only have 3000 cavalry. It is well known to thoſe who have ſerved on the European continent, that the high perfection to which cavalry has there been brought, and the eſtimation in which it has been held, has ariſen entirely from the openneſs of the country, and there being ſcarce any encloſures to interrupt the movements of horſe. A column of infantry, with its cannon diſmounted or thrown into confuſion, is there irrecoverably loſt, if attacked by horſe vigorouſly.

Ireland is filled with bogs; many tracts of it are covered with rocks and precipices. Every part of it is interſected with ſtone walls, ditches and hedges; all of which are almoſt unſur-

* An army can never produce more than $\frac{3}{4}$ths of its nominal ſtrength at moſt.

mountable obſtacles to the movements of cavalry. An infantry can here eaſily take a poſition, which will enable it in a few minutes to remedy any confuſion into which it is thrown. If diſordered, it may retire at ſome diſtance, form anew with perfect ſafety; and if reinforced, return to the attack. A ſtone wall or ditch ſaves the fugitives from the purſuit, not only of cavalry, but even of infantry, which cannot cloſely purſue them without falling into equal confuſion.

The flying artillery, which is ſo capitally well ſerved in France, gives its armies a new addition to their ſtrength, by uniting all the execution of cannon with the vivacity for which the French troops have ever been ſo celebrated. A battery thus mounted, will move from one column to another, with as much rapidity as a large body of cavalry. A few diſcharges of grape ſhot from it will repulſe the moſt vigorous charge of heavy cavalry; and it is calculated to ſeize a number of advantages, of which neither horſe nor foot could ſo eaſily profit.

Upon the whole, our troops are altogether inferior to the French in the important particular of familiarity with danger; and it would be, in my opinion, little leſs than abſolute madneſs to give battle even to 20,000 of them with the ſmall army we have. Should that army be beaten, what is the conſequence? We have no fortreſs

fortreſs to ſtop an enemy's progreſs; no ſecond army to collect itſelf anew before the enemy, as the Auſtrians did at Kollin, after their defeat at Prague in 1757. We have ſeen the beſt affected people join the conquerors after a victory. It is notorious that a great part of the people of this country are not well affected. Should the French gain a victory which would render them maſters of Ireland, (and one victory eaſily would) they would ſo firmly eſtabliſh themſelves, that 100,000 troops from England could not afterwards expel them.

I would ſeriouſly recommend it to the government of Ireland, to give its generals the three following important inſtructions:

I. Give battle to the enemy upon no account, however great his inſults, or however contemptible his appearance may be.

II. Harraſs him with ſkirmiſhes day and night, ſo as to wear out his troops with fatigue, and accuſtom your own to danger.

III. Eſtabliſh as regular a diſcipline as you are able; for neither Auſtrian nor Pruſſian will do in regiments commanded by gentlemen of fortune, and ſergeants who return them for parliament. Endeavour to ſupply your deficiency in ſubordination, by inſpiring your

troops with a thirſt for glory and a horror of ſhame.

The philoſopher Montaigne, with very great reaſon, ridicules Plutarch for having, in his account of the battle of Pharſalia, beſtowed ſuch eulogiums on Cæſar for attacking Pompey's army; and borrowing Cæſar's own words, which ſay, that aggreſſion gives fire and confidence to the aſſailants. Had Cæſar's army been routed, obſerves that inimitable Gaſcon, Plutarch would not have failed extolling Pompey's profound military ſkill in ſtanding upon the defenſive, and attributing his victory entirely to it*.

In

* Cæſar's obſervation is remarkable, though I will be ſo preſumptuous here as to diſpute its juſtice, at leaſt at the preſent day: "Propterea quod eſt quædam animi incitatio "atque alacritas naturaliter innata omnibus quæ ſtudio pug-"næ incenditur: *hanc non reprimere ſed augere imperatores debent, &c.* Cæſar in bello civili. Obſerve, that in Cæſar's time an army in marching to the attack of an intrenchment, could not be torn to pieces with grape ſhot as they now can.

I have often been reflecting upon the exceſſive difficulty of weighing the exact extent of a man's abilities; and upon the fooliſh plauſibility with which modern hiſtorians pretend to deſcribe the characters of men dead for centuries, as if they had known them perſonally. Above all characters, that of a general requires an equal mixture of ability and good fortune to raiſe it to eminence: perhaps more of the latter than the former.

It

In every battle one of the parties muſt be beaten; and I am ſteadfaſtly of opinion, that the general who is beaten in his intrenchments, would juſt as ſoundly be beaten in the plain. It is all a jargon to ſay a man may not be as good a ſoldier behind a breaſt work, as before it. He ſtands almoſt perfectly ſafe, and ſees his cannon and ſmall arms ſpread death and deſtruction amid the advancing foe. Numerous inſtances occur in modern hiſtory, where even indifferent generals have acted on the defenſive, and have been victorious.

The

It is extremely fortunate for a number of generals who now ſhine in hiſtory, that they were born without competitors. Had Julius Cæſar been Archduke of Auſtria when the King of Pruſſia made war upon Maria Tereſa, perhaps that war would not have ended as it did. Or had Frederick II. been commander in chief of Darius's forces when Perſia was invaded by the Macedonians, perhaps Alexander would not have been conquerer of the world.

Of all characters, antient or modern, Epaminondas, from what I have heard of him, appears to me to have been the moſt accompliſhed captain, as well as the greateſt man. Virtues in almoſt all men border upon Vices; but they did not in him. He united two things which are ſcarce ever found even ſingly in the human character—perfect humility with perfect heroiſm.

In almoſt every general we may perceive the main object diſtracted by ſome favourite purſuit; but in his character the moſt ſcrupulous exactneſs will in vain ſearch for criticiſm. He muſt ſurely have been a perfect maſter of tactics, whoſe manœuvres ſuch a captain as the late King of Pruſſia, 2000

years

The battle of Pultova, where the Swediſh army was entirely deſtroyed before the Ruſſian intrenchments, is a memorable proof of it. Fontenoy affords another.

It was by a mere accident that the King of Pruſſia obtained the victory, when he attacked Marſhal Daun in his ſtrong poſition at Torgau in Saxony, in 1760. His vanguard of 5000 grenadiers, led on by himſelf, was totally annihilated before they could even diſcharge their muſkets, in leſs than half an hour, by the Auſtrian artillery. His defeat was certain had not general Lacy neglected to occupy a defile in rear of the army, through which Ziethen and Mœllendorff penetrated with ſome thouſands of Pruſſians.

The battle of Frankfort on the Oder, between the King of Pruſſia, and the Auſtrians

years after, and notwithſtanding the total change which the art of war has undergone, adopted.

What a deplorable ravage has time committed in taking away the Plutarch's lives of the Grecian and Scipio Africanus! What profit, inſtruction and delight would not theſe two portaits, drawn by the maſter pencil of Plutarch, have afforded to the ſoldier, the ſtateſman, and the moraliſt!

The biography left us by antients and moderns, have not ſupplied the loſs. Plutarch has given us many a man as a hero, who would be hanged at any of our aſſizes for murder, inceſt, ſodomy, and other crimes of a brutal and infamous nature.

and

and Ruſſians, on the 12th of Auguſt, 1759, the moſt dreadful of the preſent century, and the moſt obſtinately diſputed, is an ever memorable proof of what an intrenched army can effect, if it poſſeſſes obſtinacy and reſolution. The following deſcription of it, which I am juſt now reading, I ſhall beg leave to tranſlate, as it may not only amuſe my readers, but powerfully illuſtrate my obſervation.

" The King," ſays an eye-witneſs, " now re-
" ſolved to give the enemy battle without de-
" lay. His united force amounted to 40,000
" men; that of the enemy was, however,
" 70,000. They lay intrenched upon the
" heights between Frankfort and Cunnerſdorf,
" and were covered by an immenſe artillery.
" Their right wing leaned upon the Oder, and
" their left was ſecured by a moraſs and thick-
" ets. Before their front lay low grounds.
" All theſe advantages notwithſtanding, the
" King reſolved to attack them upon the 12th
" of Auguſt.

" He formed his army in a wood, whence his
" line fell by columns upon the left wing of the
" Ruſſians with the greateſt reſolution. This
" wing ſtood upon a height called the *Windmill-*
" *Hill.* The King's intention was to take the
" enemy at the ſame moment in front, in flank,
" and in rear. But unfortunately he was not ſuf-
" ficiently

" ficiently acquainted with the ground. A
" number of trenches unexpectedly impeded
" the march. Great circuits muſt be made by
" which the troops were fatigued, and much
" precious time loſt. The heavy cannon which
" could not be managed in the wood, muſt be
" limbered and drawn by horſes. At length,
" however, the Pruſſians cloſed upon the Ruſ-
" ſian intrenchments, covered by the fire of
" three batteries. The Ruſſians returned the
" fire from a hundred pieces of cannon, which
" they had collected upon their left wing. The
" King now gave orders to ſtorm the enemy's
" batteries. The grenadiers deſtined for that
" attack, worked their way through a thicket,
" advanced through a hollow way, and finally
" gained the heights cloſe to the Ruſſian in-
" trenchments, from which they received ſeve-
" ral furious diſcharges of grape ſhot. Inſtead
" of being diſcouraged, this made them re-
" double their pace, and they fell into the in-
" trenchments with their bayonets. All reſiſ-
" tance now ceaſed, and the enemy were driv-
" en entirely from their redoubts. Their
" whole left wing fled and abandonded their
" artillery.

" The battle began at noon, and at ſix in
" the evening the Pruſſians had made them-
" ſelves maſters of all the batteries on this
" wing, with more than a hundred pieces of
" cannon,

" cannon, and ſome thouſand priſoners. The " victory now ſeemed to have been decided, " and couriers were inſtantly diſpatched from " the field of battle to Berlin and Sileſia with " the pleaſing intelligence, when the fortune " of the day all at once changed in the " ſtrangeſt and moſt unaccountable manner.

" The Pruſſian infantry had now performed " all which could be expected from it; but its " victory could not be taken advantage of: the " Pruſſian cavalry ſtood upon the other wing, " and the cannon could not ſo immediately " follow. This diſagreeable circumſtance was " ſtill the more diſadvantageous, as the ground " was as favourable to the operations of artil- " lery, as it was unfavourable to the move- " ments of infantry. At length ſome pieces " of cannon were brought forward on the " heights, but in too ſmall a number for ſo " great an undertaking.

" Meanwhile the King, at the head of his " left wing, attacked the Ruſſians; as did alſo " General Finck's corps. But in advancing " towards the enemy great obſtacles were met " with. In ſome places the troops were oblig- " ed to defile over narrow bridges, in others " between ponds and trenches. The Ruſſians " profited of the interval to aſſemble and make " their artillery act with effect; and Laudon,

" with the Auſtrians who had hitherto no
" ſhare in the battle, now put themſelves in
" motion. The King now ordered General
" Seidlitz, with the cavalry, to advance. They
" according defiled through the trenches form-
" ed under the Ruſſian batteries, and advanced
" towards them; but the dreadful ſhower of
" grape ſhot which deſtroyed whole bodies of
" men and horſes, threw this intrepid caval-
" ry into confuſion, and compelled them to
" flight.

" The Pruſſians, nevertheleſs, had loſt no-
" thing; on the contrary, they ſtill maintain-
" tained the advantage. The Ruſſians, 80 and
" 100 men deep, crowded on each other, form-
" ed a chaos; but this chaos was covered by
" 50 pieces of cannon loaded with grape ſhot.
" The Pruſſians were exceſſively fatigued by a
" march of fifteen leagues, exceſſive combat, and
" the great heat of the day. They had gained
" the victory however, and it appeared more
" than probable that the Ruſſians, whoſe loſs
" was exceſſive, would retire during the night.
" They would willingly have abandoned to
" the victors the honor of the day without
" diſpute, but they depended more for ſafety
" upon defending their laſt intrenchment, than
" on a retreat by day light. The King, how-
" ever, thought nothing was effected ſo long
" as any thing remained to be done. He was

" of

" of opinion, and ſhewed it upon this occaſion,
" that the Ruſſian army muſt not only be van-
" quiſhed, but annihilated, as it always re-
" turned to renew its devaſtations. The Pruſ-
" ſian generals, particularly Seidlitz, repre-
" ſented on the contrary the exceſſive fatigue
" of the troops. The arguments of this cele-
" brated general, of whoſe perſonal courage
" the King had ſo many proofs, ſeemed to de-
" cide the queſtion; when another general of
" diſtinction came up, whom the King aſked,
" *Wedel, what is your opinion?*" In the ſtrain
" of a courtier the latter was of the King's
" ſentiments, and the battle was now ordered
" to be renewed.

" The final deciſion of the battle depended
" on the ſeizing of the eminence called Spitz-
" berg, which covered a paſture field. This
" paſture was 400 yards long, 50 or 60 broad,
" and between ten and fifteen deep. Its ſides
" were very ſteep, and occupied by Laudon's
" beſt troops. The Pruſſians threw themſelves
" into it, and endeavoured to gain the oppoſite
" border; but all their efforts were fruitleſs,
" and thoſe who had the fortune to aſcend,
" were either inſtantly killed or thrown back
" headlong.

" The intrepidity of the Pruſſians was in
" vain exerted to ſupply their exhauſted
" ſtrength. The *Spitzberg* was repeatedly

" ſtormed, but never ſurmounted. The in-
" ceſſant fire of artillery and ſmall arms from
" the Ruſſians and Auſtrians did terrible exe-
" cution among the Pruſſians. Finck endea-
" voured in vain to ſtorm other heights. The
" King in perſon expoſed himſelf to the great-
" eſt danger; his uniform was ſhot through,
" and two horſes were killed under him. One
" of his aide-de-camps ſaved him by giving
" him his own horſe. Every attempt to drive
" the Ruſſians and Auſtrians from the heights
" was fruitleſs.

" The Pruſſian cavalry now attempted to
" ſtorm theſe heights; but all the cavalry tac-
" tics of Seidlitz were here of no avail. Ac-
" cuſtomed under his command to bear down
" all oppoſition of horſe and foot, the horſe
" here yielded in an unequal conteſt with the
" Ruſſian artillery, and their intrepid general
" was himſelf wounded. Prince Eugene of
" Wirtemberg, who led them to a ſecond at-
" tack, ſhared the ſame fate. He was ſucceed-
" ed by general Putkammer, who was killed
" on the ſpot. The remaining principal ge-
" nerals of the army, Finck and Hilſen, were
" alſo wounded. The Pruſſian troops, horſe
" and foot, now fell into the greateſt diſorder.
" In this critical moment Laudon wheeled
" around the right wing with freſh troops,
" and fell on the Pruſſians, totally exhauſted

" with

" with fatigue, in front and in rear. This " general, who had ſo often profited of the " favourable moment in a battle, ruſhed for- " ward with his cavalry, and fell in among " the confuſed ranks of the Pruſſians. The " battle was now quickly decided. * * * * *

" This battle was the moſt bloody of the " whole war. The Pruſſians had 8000 men " killed, and 12000 wounded. All their ge- " nerals and officers of rank were wounded. " The Ruſſians, by their own confeſſion, had " 16000 men killed and wounded." *

If ſuch unſkilful generals (as the conduct of the Ruſſian commanders in this terrible battle, and indeed during the whole of the ſeven years war, ſhewed them to be) could vanquiſh the beſt diſciplined troops in the univerſe, led on by one of the greateſt of generals, as Frederick ſurely was, could not be effected by intelligent officers at the head of troops who fought for their country!

In fact, nothing can ſhew the capacity of a general, more than his choice of a poſition, which will preſent inſurmountable obſtacles to an enemy, and maintain his army by his good diſpoſitions in that poſition. For the braveſt

* Archenholtz Geſchichte des Siebeniaehrigen krieges in Deutſchland, 8vo. Berlin, 1789.

of

of troops will loſe their courage in attempting to ſtorm ſuch a poſt.

The King of Pruſſia himſelf has made an admirable reflexion of this nature in his obſervations on the battle of Pultova. *On ſait que les troupes les plus traves perd a la fin le courage quand, a une attaque longue et meurtriere on leur oppoſe des difficultés ſans fin et toujours renouvellees.**

There is no ſort of inſult to the militia of Ireland, in telling them they are ſtill inferior to that of France. When they have ſeen as much fighting as the French troops, or perhaps even leſs, I doubt not but that they ſhall be even ſuperior to the latter.

The following is an outline of my plan of defence with 40,000 men:

Athlone, (grand army)	25,000 men,	
Armagh, - -	4,000	Obſervation.
Fermoy, - -	4,000	
Dublin, (reſerve)	7,000	
	40,000	

Place the grand magazine at a day's march eaſt of Athlone, to avoid any danger from the enemy's ſailing up the Shannon, and marching along that river. Now ſuppoſing the enemy

* Oeuvres poſthumes, vol. 5, p. 96.

lands

lands either in the North or South, your grand army can, by four day's march, join either corps of obſervation; each of which lies about that diſtance from Athlone, and thus be ready to oppoſe near 30,000 men to the enemy.

Let us, however, ſuppoſe them to land in Galway, as is moſt probable; and that your grand army breaks off from Athlone and advances to meet them. The enemy will at leaſt take four or five days to diſembark, and recover from their ſea ſickneſs. Before that, your army can have time to march near Galway, and intrench itſelf in the moſt formidable manner.

We will ſuppoſe the enemy depends upon being joined by a number of the country people: but that they are even provided with three month's proviſions. It is our duty to avoid an action during that period. At all events, a famine will be created in Galway, if its ſupplies are cut off from the eaſtward. The country which lies to its weſtward is the pooreſt in Ireland.

Reinforce your army as follows:

Take 2000 men from each of your corps of obſervation, and 3000 from your reſerve; march them to your army, which by that means will conſiſt of 32,000. Immediately on the grand army's

army's breaking off, let the reſerve occupy its poſition at Athlone.

An excellent poſition may be taken on the heights which extend from Oranmore to Clare Galway. Both flanks are ſecured, on the left by the ſea, and the right by the bogs bordering Lough Corrib. But it is rather too extenſive for any army leſs than 50,000 men to occupy.

Let us ſuppoſe a poſition open in the rear, and its flanks ſecured either by Nature or very formidable batteries. Obſerve that its front ſlopes in a glacis for at leaſt 800 yards. Level with the ground every buſh, hedge, ſtone wall, &c. which can interrupt your fire, or cover the enemy. Be ſure no height commands you within 1000 yards on any ſide.

Fortify in the moſt formidable manner a ſpace which can contain 12 or 14 battalions in front, with a line of redoubts and a broad deep ditch. Mount theſe redoubts with cannon of every calibre you are able, and take care that their fires effectually croſs each other. Leave openings in your intrenchments ſtopped with *chevaux de frize*, through which your cavalry may pour down upon the enemy if thrown into diſorder: be ſure your infantry never follows them. I could mention a number

ber of battles which have been loſt on this account. The aſſailants are compelled to retire: the infantry purſues them; they are themſelves repulſed in their turn; their own artillery muſt be ſilent, and the enemy enters pell mell with them the intrenchments.

Place your infantry on two lines: your grenadiers and cavalry at a convenient diſtance in the rear ready to ſupport them.

Fortify your rear, ſo as you can, if neceſſary, change your front. Be ſure you are elevated conſiderably over the enemy's batteries. Their artillery will then fire without much effect.

Let the three corps in your rear croſs the Shannon, and advance to within a day or two's march of the army. They will preſerve your communication with the grand magazine, protect your convoys, and hang on the enemy's flanks.

Be ſure you can ſupply yourſelf at all times with ammunition and proviſions. The want of both is equally fatal. After an action an army always feels the want of powder.

Situated in the above manner, await with firmneſs the enemy's approach. He cannot leave ſo formidable an army as your's in his

rear. If he gives you battle in your intrenchments, it muſt be ſtrange if he gains the victory. If he does not attack you, he daily loſes his ſtrength by ſickneſs and famine.

Such, on the whole, is my plan of defence.

It muſt, however, be obſerved, that I have taken it for granted, *the French on their landing will not be joined by the people.* Should it happen otherwiſe, and that there is every appearance of a dangerous inſurrection, I propoſe an oppoſite plan. Affairs being then at a deſperate criſis, I would by all means recommend it, to collect all the forces in the kingdom, horſe, foot and artillery; advance towards the enemy, and after having accuſtomed your troops to ſome day's fire, put the fate of Ireland to the deciſion of a battle. In ſuch a caſe a defenſive plan enſures our ruin, whereas a victory (ſhould we gain it) makes us triumph both over foreign and domeſtic enemies.

Another plan of defence, by a very intelligent officer, has been propoſed, of drawing a cordon along the river Shannon, and placing bodies of troops at certain intervals, where they could be eaſier maintained and ſupport each other in caſe of an attack. That they are eaſier ſubſiſted in this manner is certain. That they are alſo eaſier defeated, appears to me to be equally ſo.

Suppoſe

Suppoſe we draw a cordon of 30,000 men, by placing bodies of between 3 and 6000 men in the following places, viz. Limerick, Killaloe, Portumna, Banagher, Athlone, Laneſborough, and Carrick-on-Shannon.

Let us alſo ſuppoſe the French alter their plan of attack: that inſtead of concentering their force in one place, ſuch as Galway, they divide their army into two columns. The one enters the river Shannon, the other Galway bay. Let us conceive it poſſible that each of theſe columns, 15,000 ſtrong, could land at the ſame time and advance, the one towards Athlone, and the other towards Limerick. An advanced corps of 5 or 6000 men, though ever ſo ſtrongly intrenched, will not ſtop the progreſs of three times the number of veteran Frenchmen between Athlone and Galway. Should the two French columns advance at the ſame time to attack the Iriſh corps at Limerick and Athlone, their ſuperior numbers enſure them a victory; our troops cannot leave their different cantonments without leaving the enemy to penetrate without farther trouble. Or let us ſuppoſe that they fly to the aſſiſtance of their friends, the moment they hear a firing; they will moſt probably arrive after the affair is terminated, and expoſe themſelves to be

taken or cut to pieces by the victorious enemy.*

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* The abovementioned author (a col. Keating, as I underſtand) propoſes as his model the late general Dalton's *Cordon* between the Elbe and Iſer, in 1778, during the Bavarian war.

Nothing is eaſier than to propoſe a Bohemian cordon in Ireland, by ſimply changing the names of Kænigſgrætz, Wiſſoka, Neuſtadt, Teſchen, Reichſtadt, &c. &c. into Laneſborough, Charleville, Killaloe and Athlone. But ſuch a project, plauſible as it may appear, cannot impoſe upon thoſe who are equally well acquainted with both countries.

A frontier conſiſting of a chain of mountains, thick woods, with *narrow paths*, not *high roads*, ſuch as divide Bohemia from Sileſia and Luſace, is extremely proper for a cordon; but Ireland is not. The country from Troppau to Leutmeritz has innumerable paſſes, which very ſmall detachments might defend againſt a whole army. The roads which lead to them are rugged, narrow, and incapable of admitting, without the utmoſt labour, even the lighteſt artillery. Frederick II. who had ſerved ſo many campaigns in theſe mountains, goes ſtill farther, and ſays: "On leur prouva par la "ſituation des lieux qu'il y a ſur cette frontiere de la Bohe-"me pluſiers poſtes qui en defend l'entree * * * * * *le* "*moindre deſquels bien defendu, arreteroit une armée comme* "*celle de Xerxes, parce qu'ils valent bien les Thermopyles.*"

Where is there a poſt in Ireland like Thermopyle? We have no woods either on our mountains or vallies like Germany. Our principal boaſt is the excellence of our roads, which lead even through our mountains, and our ſtone bridges even in the moſt rude parts of Ireland. There are no leſs than *ſeven* different roads acroſs the Shannon in the cordon beforementioned, all of them fit for the heavieſt artillery.

The art of chuſing advantageous poſitions for encamping, by ſeizing which a general

tillery. Numberleſs bye roads, fit alſo for cavalry and cannon, lead to theſe through every part of the country. How are they all to be defended by ſo ſmall an army as our's?

In 1778, the Saxon frontier of Bohemia was defended by an army of 50,000 Auſtrians under Laudon, one of the moſt celebrated generals of the age; yet could he not prevent the Pruſſians from entering that kingdom. Prince Henry of Pruſſia divided his army into different bodies. Theſe entered Bohemia, *turned* and attacked the detachments which the Auſtrians had in the ſtrong poſts of Slukenau, Gabel, &c. and diſlodged them. The conſequence of this was, that Laudon was obliged to abandon all his magazines, and even his intrenchments, at Leutmeritz, and fall back into Bohemia.

Prince Henry's admirers rummaged Grecian and Roman hiſtory for a compariſon between this manœuvre and ſome of thoſe of antient wars. They fixed on Hannibal's paſſage of the Alps. For my own part I can ſee nothing marvellous in this invaſion of Bohemia. But I ſhould think it truly wonderful if a cordon of 50,000 men could defend the Shannon againſt 30,000 French.

Had Dalton commanded the army of his country upon an invaſion, I do not think he would have ever thought of defending it by the plan of a cordon; fully acquainted with the difference between the banks of the Elbe and thoſe of the Shannon; the fire and inexperience of the Iriſh militia man, and the ſtupid intrepidity of the Bohemian muſketeer.

The military qualities of that excellent man, however great, were happily for him very inferior to his private ones; for what is war but a ſplendid butchery! He was, in every particular, an ornament to the country which he ſerved, and to that which produced him: and thoſe who had the advantage of ſerving under him, will long revere his virtues and regret his loſs.

cannot

cannot be forced to give battle againſt his will, is perhaps the greateſt of all talents in a commander, and that which moſt effectually defends a country. It is no where in Europe perhaps ſo well underſtood as by the Auſtrian generals.

Their general poſition is an amphitheatre of two or three lines upon a riſing ground, each covered by a formidable artillery.

Their firſt line is formed at the bottom of the eminence; was it upon a height, it could not deſcend without breaking its order.

The ſecond line, equally well provided with artillery, is ſuſtained by the cavalry, which ruſhes forward and charges if the enemy is put into diſorder. But if their firſt line is beaten, the aſſailants have a new battle to begin with freſh troops in the ſecond.

Their flanks are always covered by their beſt artillery, and every irregular ſpot on them is choſen to place cannon, whoſe fires may croſs each other. Moraſſes, defiles, &c. are alſo choſen for the purpoſe of obviating an enemy's attack on the flanks.

Every eminence within a mile of the army is occupied by a ſtrong detachment. Theſe ſerve to obſerve the enemy. If attacked, they

are

are inſtantly reinforced, and the grand army endeavours to take the enemy in flank or rear.

Experience has ſhewn them the advantage of confining their front, and conſequently giving it the more depth and force, provided they can furniſh their flanks with proper poſitions to lean upon.

Before, however, the general of an army takes any poſition, it will be abſolutely neceſſary for him to ſend ſeveral officers to examine the country, and make maps of the different poſitions it affords. Care muſt be taken that theſe officers are expert in judging of the *relative* heights and diſtances of places. This is the moſt important, as well as difficult, of all arts in engineering. Finally, the general himſelf, with a ſtrong eſcort, ſhould reconnoitre the ground.

The laſt hints I ſhall give are relative to the interior diſcipline of our army, and the ſorts of rewards and puniſhments that we ſhould affix to merit or diſhonour. I well know that continential ſtrictneſs would not be adviſable in our army; but there is a medium between ſeverity and indulgence.

Such officers as diſtinguiſh themſelves eminently at the head of detachments, ſhould be rapidly promoted to the rank of generals, whatever

whatever their original obſcurity might have been. They are the men proper for command, not perſons who have nothing to plead but birth, titles and fortune. When an officer ſhews a genius for the art of war, he ſhould be advanced without any deference to ſeniority, which is far from being an invariable proof of merit. A mule, ſays the King of Pruſſia, who had ſerved ten campaigns under Prince Eugene, would not be the better tactician; and it muſt be allowed, adds he, that many old officers who have ſeen ſervice, are very little better than this mule.

It is deplorable that in the Britiſh ſervice the ſale of commiſſions ſhould ſo totally diſcourage emulation and merit. The rich officer and the poor one, are equally negligent. The former, becauſe merit is not neceſſary for his promotion; the latter, becauſe money is.

Brevet rank in the army ſhould be given to ſuch officers in the militia as diſtinguiſh themſelves.

The regiments ſhould be perſuaded that it is diſhonourable to the laſt degree to loſe their colours or their cannon, before at leaſt half their men have fallen.

I admire the croſſes given in the Pruſſian and Auſtrian ſervices to reward valour. They coſt the

the ſtate nothing, and amply recompenſe a courageous exploit*. To be pointed out as an object of praiſe, gratifies the vanity ſo natural to the human heart, much more than the moſt ſolid rewards.

A ſilver or gold medal ſhould be given to ſuch privates as have ſignalized themſelves.

Death ſhould invariably be the puniſhment of any officer who ſhall behave with palpable cowardice before the enemy. A coward by his crime, ſhews that he is inſenſible of ſhame, and that death is the puniſhment that is moſt terrible to him.

The officer who, on a picquet or detachment, ſhall not have made a proper reſiſtance before he ſurrendered himſelf to the enemy, as a priſoner, ſhould not be exchanged during the war. The Romans never exchanged their priſoners; which ſufficiently accounts for the deſperate reſiſtance often made by ſmall parties of them.

THESE, and many more meaſures of a ſimilar nature, will be neceſſary, in order to bring into

* It muſt be confeſſed, the croſſes of Maria Tereſa have a penſion annexed to them.

the field an Iriſh army; formidable not by its numbers, but by its valour, its diſcipline and its patriotiſm. Ireland ſhould ever remember that ſhe has a nation to combat, which, alas! but too ſeriouſly threatens to overthrow every empire in the univerſe.*

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* The Revolution of France does not ſeem to ſtrike moſt people with the ideas which ſhould naturally ariſe from the importance of the ſubject; nor do reflexions ſeem to have been made upon the obvious tendency of its future operations.

The general rule in conjectures upon the future, is to judge from the paſt, and to obſerve the uſual effects of particular cauſes. But it is true, that this rule in the preſent caſe does not operate: the French revolution having almoſt completely belied the examples which the hiſtory of every country upon the face of the globe has left us.

The moſt important event it has cauſed, is the abolition of the Chriſtian religion. The conſequences which that event may produce, are much more alarming to the other governments of Europe, than is commonly imagined. May it not among others produce the two following?

1. The total abolition of every eccleſiaſtical eſtabliſhment or function; ſubſtituting inſtead of the prieſthood, a clerk or ſecretary in each diſtrict, to regiſter the birth and death of every citizen.

2. The abolition of all influence hitherto derived from birth and titles; and affix reſpect to nothing but merit.

If the French principles have ſtruck a deep root in the different countries in Europe, it will be impoſſible to eradi-

cate

An army, whoſe officers from the higheſt to the loweſt, are animated with a reſolution to conquer or to die, will readily infuſe that ſpirit into the ſoldiers that follow them. So long as it operates, if ably directed, it will triumph over numbers and every thing elſe.

cate them. The day is now paſt when veneration was attached to titles and authority. The divine right of kings, and their vicegerency upon earth, which had formerly ſuch powerful influence, are now wholly forgotten. But it will ſtill remain a queſtion among many, whether patriotic virtues cannot be exerted with as much vigor, though leſs ſplendor, in a monarchy as in a republic.

The governments of Europe have hitherto been ſupported by two pillars—the civil and eccleſiaſtical. If one of theſe is deſtroyed, the other muſt fall with the whole edifice. The military has no influence in any country in Europe, except perhaps in Ruſſia.

It is unfortunate for the Chriſtian religion, that it has been attacked rather forcibly by libertines for having, by its unlimited inculcation of the forgiveneſs of injuries and obedience to ſupreme authority, encouraged deſpotiſm in ſovereigns, and abject ſlavery in ſubjects. It is alſo unfortunate, that vaſt numbers of people profeſs it only from cuſtom, and being educated in what they call *its prejudices*, but without any inward conviction of its authenticity. Their deference to its exterior threatens every day to decline with rapidity.

It may, perhaps, be ſucceeded by a total abolition of all the exteriors of worſhip, and by a deiſm which may contain the principles of morality and benevolence, and a doubt concerning the future. But ſhould this faith create a total equa-

lity

It is a ſpecies of folly in individuals to attempt to dictate rules of conduct to a whole nation, eſpecially in war, the moſt difficult of all arts: but it is the duty of every good citizen to offer his advice upon every occaſion, on which it may be of any ſervice to his country.

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lity among a people, it will render them more powerful than they have hitherto been, by giving every individual a property to defend. For intereſt operates much more powerfully in the human breaſt than principle.

To contend with an army compoſed of men in whom intereſt has begot principle, would be vain, becauſe they will find friends among the lower claſſes of people in every country; and becauſe the defenders of every country are now compoſed (I mean the common ſoldiers) of its refuſe, equally void of honor, of patriotiſm, or of principle—the outcaſts of ſociety.

Should this general revolution take place in every European country, and ſhould it have the power of convincing people of their true intereſts, it will make Europe one immenſe commonwealth, under the ſame general laws, religion and manners. If this commonwealth is active, it will eaſily conquer all the other nations of the globe, and eſtabliſh its own manners, &c. among them: if otherwiſe, it will for ever aboliſh wars, and retrench all military eſtabliſhments, except what will be neceſſary for maintaining the police, and repelling any inroads of barbarians upon its eaſtern frontier. From theſe, however, gunpowder has nothing to fear. We no longer fight with the club aud ſpear. The modern improvements upon artillery and engineering, are ſo complicated and ſo dreadful, as will always make us ſuperior to an enemy in

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Is it not a misfortune that the relaxed diſcipline of our armies, abſolutely in a manner renders a number of our officers ignorant of the real end of their profeſſion? Many young men embrace it from whim; ſome from neceſſity; few from zeal; the greateſt part for amuſement.

The young officer ſhould know that he enters the army, not for his amuſement, but for the defence of his country; that his pay is deſtined to ſupport him with frugality, not to diſſipate in brothels and gaming tables—the infamous receptacles of every vice, the abominable corrupters of every virtue.

He ſhould above all conſider the duty which he owes to his country; a duty which ſuperſedes every other conſideration of whatever weight or importance it may be. By it he

any degree leſs acquainted with them, conſequently leſs civilized than ourſelves. Millions of Goths and Vandals would now find their grave before they penetrated far into Europe.

But I am inclined to think this will not be altogether the effect of the French Revolution. Ambition is deeply rooted in the human breaſt, and ſome men are born with ſuperior abilities, who may perſuade any aſſembly or nation to act contrary to their true intereſts.

Perhaps alſo the natural imbecility of human nature, having ſought relief in vain from reaſon which is only uncertainty, muſt once more have recourſe to new altars and new divinities.

has

has been produced; by it he is ſupported; and with it he will one day be united. His life, however precious it may appear to him, is but a very trifling offering at the altar of his country; to invade or to injure which, in the ſmalleſt degree, he ſhould eſteem a moſt unpardonable ſacrilege, to be atoned for only by the deſtruction of every aggreſſor.

Man is not immortal. Death equally awaits the coward and the hero. The ſoldier ſhould however conſider, that his life belongs to his country; that he ſhould be prodigal of it only when his country is in danger; not in ſingle combats invented during the days of Gothic barbariſm, and authoriſed by cowardice, by prejudice, and by folly.

No true ſoldier will ſcruple to embrace death when his country requires it: no true ſoldier will refuſe to retire before his enemy when he can reſerve his life for a better day. To abandon his poſt without reſiſtance enſures him eternal infamy; to fall in defending the poſt aſſigned to him by his country, ſecures his memory a place among her heroes.

I fondly indulge a hope that ſuch are the ſentiments of the riſing generation in Ireland. Shall my hope be well founded, we have little to fear from invaſion.

Shall

Shall oppoſite ſentiments to theſe, however, prevail, and degeneracy have infuſed her influence, all exhortation is unneceſſary, and we have only to reconcile ourſelves to ſlavery, to contempt, and to barbariſm.

The alternative now reſts with us.

THE END.